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Preface
The Obama administration has implemented several policies to
“jump-start”theU.S.economy.Twocorepremisesarethatmon-
etary measures are required to strengthen the financial system
before the rest of the economy can recover,and that most major
banks have a temporary liquidity problem induced by malfunc-
tioningfinancialmarkets.Theadministration’seffortshavelargely
focused on preserving the financial interests of major banks.
Research Associate Éric Tymoigne and Senior Scholar L.
Randall Wray believe that maintaining the status quo is not the
solution,sinceitoverlooksthedebtproblemsof householdsand
nonfinancial businesses—re-creating the financial conditions
that led to disaster will set the stage for a recurrence of the Great
DepressionoraJapanese-style“lostdecade.”Theyrecommenda
more radical policy agenda, such as federal spending programs
thatdirectlyprovidejobsandsustainemployment,therebyhelp-
ing to restore the creditworthiness of borrowers, the profitabil-
ity of firms,and the fiscal position of state and federal budgets.





leverage and profit rates must grow faster in order to maintain a
certain level of profitability. History shows that lending against
expectedincreasesinassetvaluesisalmostalwaysarecipefortrou-
ble.Sinceleverageishighlyprocyclical,anunconstrainedfinancial
system will tend toward explosive growth during a boom. The
notionthatlegislatedcapitalrequirements(suchasthoseinherent
in the Basel agreements) can constrain growth and risk is, there-
fore, flawed. And the argument that the U.S. government had to
injectcapitalandgetthebadassetsoffthebooksinordertoencour-
age banks to lend again is nonsensical. More lending, say the
authors,isnotasolutiontoexcessiveleverageanddebt.
There has been a long-term trend toward nonbank finan-
cial institutions (the “shadow banking sector”) and the “origi-
nate to distribute”model.The public scolding of banks for“not
providing credit” is misplaced, since the “shadow” sector is
shrinkingbalancesheetsandcuttingoff credit.Themarketwants
more deleveraging because of solvency risks,not liquidity prob-
lems, so there will be no sustainable recovery until these debts
are reduced and incomes begin growing again.
While Washington’s focus is on the staggering government
debtandunsustainablefiscaldeficits,therealconcernshouldbe
the debt level of the private domestic sector. It is important to
recognize that government debt is low relative to the size of the
U.S.economy,anddeleveragingintheprivatesectorcannothap-
penwithoutanexpansionof thegovernmentdeficit.Otherwise,
there is risk of a full-blown debt-deflation process. The current
approach of the financial institutions that created the mess is to
discourage loan renegotiations and modifications because pre-
venting resolution is more profitable,based on the money to be
madebysqueezingdebtorswithfeesandpenalties.Thisexplains
why current policies have failed to keep people in their homes.
Andthepromisetocreatethreemillionnewjobswhenthereare
already 9.5 million fewer jobs than at the start of the downturn
indicates that current efforts are grossly insufficient. The finan-
cial bailout has crowded out more sensible spending policies.
The authors maintain that the government’s programs will
notworkunlesstheydealwiththecoreissue:manyfinancialinsti-
tutions are probably insolvent and should not be saved because
theyformabarriertosustainablerecovery.Policyshoulddownsize
thetrade-andfee-drivenfinancialsector,reducemonopolypower,
increase supervision and regulation (and restore proper under-
writing),andfavorsmall,independentfinancialinstitutions.Policy
should also support countercyclical government employment
programssuchasthosecreatedundertheNewDeal,helphouse-
holds to restructure their finances and remain in their homes,
and reallocate commitments that favor the financial sector.
As always,I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B.Papadimitriou,President
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It Isn’t Working
Introduction
With employment numbers dropping rapidly, the finances of
state governments, households, and businesses worsening, and
highlyleveragedfinancialinstitutionsoverwhelmedbyamoun-
tain of “legacy” assets, the Obama administration has had a lot
to deal with in its first few months in office. Unfortunately, like
theBushadministrationbeforeit,theObamateamappearstobe
tryingtore-createthebubblyfinancialconditionsthatledtodis-
aster. This tack is not likely to succeed, and it is displacing poli-





This is why we recommend an abrupt change of course and the
pursuit of a more radical policy agenda.
Instead of trying to revive the productive economy,most of
the recovery effort so far has consisted of CPR for Wall Street.
Fearing what it might find if it actually examined the books of
financial institutions in detail, the administration put a chosen
handful through a wimpy “stress test” after announcing that
nonewouldfail.Ratherthanclosingmassivelyinsolventinstitu-
tions,Washingtoncontinuestoallowthemtoconduct“business
as usual,”and to show questionable profits so that they can pay
out big bonuses to the geniuses who created the toxic waste that
brought on the crisis.
In short, current policy serves to preserve the interests of
big financial companies rather than to implement government
programs that would directly sustain employment and restore
state finances. To make matters worse, the Obama administra-
tion is already preoccupied with“paying for”additional spend-
ing through tax hikes, or through spending cuts elsewhere. It
does not appear to be willing to let the fiscal position of the fed-
eral budget grow as needed to meet current challenges.We sus-
pectthebalanced-budgetcrazinesswillgetworseduringthenext
election season—much as President Roosevelt’s 1936 campaign





lenders to renegotiate mortgages have failed miserably,and per-
sonal income is falling at a terrifying rate. Already, 6.5 million
peoplehavelosttheirjobs,including500,000inJune2009alone.
Theadministration’spromisethatthestimuluspackagewillcre-
ate 3.5 million jobs over the next two years is unsatisfying in the
face of these challenges.
Weneedfederalgovernmentspendingprogramstoprovide
jobs and incomes that will restore the creditworthiness of bor-
rowersandtheprofitabilityof firms.Weneedaswiftanddetailed
investigation of financial institutions’ balance sheets, and reso-
lutionof thosefirmsfoundtobeinsolvent.Weneedtodownsize
financial institutions that are “too big to fail” while putting in
place new regulations and supervisory practices to lessen the
possibility of system fragility as the economy recovers.We need
a package of policies to relieve households of intolerable debt
burdens.And, given that the current crisis was fueled in part by
a housing boom, we need to find a way to deal with the over-
supply of homes and high vacancy rates that are driving down
real estate values and increasing the social costs for communi-
ties.And we’ve gottoreininthemoneymanagersthatseemtobe
dictatingpolicy.
How Did We Get Here?
Inaword:leverage.Therearedifferentkindsof leverage,andwe
usedthemall.Incomewasleveragedbyhouseholdsandbyfirms
in order to take on more debt.For the past dozen years,scholars
at the Levy Institute have been warning about the consequences
of apracticallyunbrokendeficitspendingspree,asevidencedby
exceptionally high debt-to-income ratios (see the following sec-
tion). Many financial institutions leveraged equity using highly
complex proprietary models to assess risk and expand balance
sheetstothemaximumextentunderthecapitalrequirementsof
Basel II.They also leveraged safe,liquid assets (e.g.,reserves and
Treasuries)andincreasedthelevelof riskyassetsasaproportion
of theirbalancesheets.Banksmovedassetsoff balancesheetand
into“special purpose vehicles”in order to avoid capital require-
ments. Overall, there was an increase in financial sector “layer-
ing,” as the nominal value of financial assets and liabilities grew
much faster than GDP.Indeed,the debt of financial institutions
grew much faster than other private sector debt.
We could say that the FIRE (finance, insurance, and real
estate) sector“leveraged”the rest of the economy,as its employ-The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 5
mentandprofitsnotonlyexpandedbutalsoaccelerated(thesec-
tor received 40 percent of the nation’s profits before the bust).
Recent revisions to the U.S. national accounts show that
Americans spend more on financial services and insurance (8.2
percentof personalconsumption,or$832billionannually)than
onfoodandbeveragesconsumedathome(7.9percent).In1995,
that pattern was reversed (7.2 versus 9 percent).While we prefer
not to get into a sterile argument about “productive” versus
“unproductive”labor,it appears in retrospect that the FIRE sec-
tor has played an outsized role in recent years (like the tail wag-
gingtheeconomy’sdog).Alleffortsareaimedatkeepingleverage
high, while the Federal Reserve (Fed) and Treasury try to get
bankstolendagain—asif anotherdebtbubblewerethecurefor
an ailing economy.
As Hyman P. Minsky argued, banking is an unusual profit-
seeking business because it is based on very high leverage ratios.
Further, banks serve an important public purpose, so they have
accesstothelenderof lastresort(theFed)andgovernmentguar-
antees. Those guarantees provide cheap and virtually unlimited
credit in the form of insured (bank) deposits. Because creditors
(depositors) will not lose if the banks fail,they feel little need to
supervise bank activities (i.e., there is no “market discipline”).
The banks, in turn, can increase profits on equity by raising the
return on assets under a given capital ratio and by reducing the
ratio of capital to assets (increasing leverage). These actions
increase the risk but can dramatically raise profitability without
upping the amount of capital at risk, since the government
insurer will absorb any equity losses on bad assets.
Minsky(2008)providedasimpleexample.Considerabank
with $25 billion in assets,$1.25 billion in capital,$187.5 million
in profits after taxes, and an allowance for loan losses. Its asset-
to-capital(orleverage)ratiois20,itsreturnonassetsis0.75per-
cent,anditsprofitonequityis15percent(20*0.75).Assumethat
the bank’s rival also has $25 billion in assets and earns $187.5
million in profits but its equity is $2.085 billion, for a leverage
ratio of 12. While the rival earns the same return on assets, it
earns 9 percent on equity. It can increase profits either by earn-
ing more on assets (by taking on riskier assets, all else equal) or
by increasing its leverage ratio (by acquiring more assets against
itslargercapitalbase).Notethatthedisparityinprofitabilitydue
to the difference in leverage ratios is dramatic: if the rival
increases its leverage to 20, it expands its assets to $41.7 billion
and its profits to $312.75 million, which is equivalent to the
profit rate of 15 percent enjoyed by the other bank. Using the
same amount of capital, the rival bank increases its loans and
depositsby$16.7billion,whileitsowners’totalexposuretolosses
remains at $2.085 billion. However, the government insurer’s
exposure increases by $16.7 billion.
As Minsky also noted, simple arithmetic shows that banks
with higher leverage and profit rates must grow faster to main-
tain a certain level of profitability, especially when shareholders
impose a specific return-on-equity target.Assuming a dividend
payout ratio of one third,banks earning a 15 percent profit rate
will accumulate capital at a 10 percent annual growth rate. To
maintain a leverage ratio of 20,asset and deposit liabilities must
increase by 20 times the increase of capital each year. Moreover,
assets will have to grow at an even faster rate if the return on
assetsincreasesunderagivenleverageratio,orifthebankincreases
its leverage ratio. Both of these events are likely in a boom, and
this explains why an otherwise unconstrained financial system
will tend toward explosive growth. Indeed, a recent paper by
economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of NewYork shows that
leverage in the financial system is highly procyclical,since assets
relative to equity expand during a boom and decline during a
bust (Adrian and Shin 2009). The notion that legislated capital
requirements such as those promulgated by Basel II can tightly
constrain growth and risk is flawed.
What if a bank discovers that, after increasing its leverage
ratio, a lot of its new loans are going bad? Assume that one out
of eight loans turns out to be toxic waste, so that the bank’s
equity disappears (and leverage has approached infinity!). One
strategy is to patiently rebuild capital through retained earnings
(assuming the bank’s other assets remain profitable). A more
aggressive strategy would be to“bet the bank”by making riskier
loans in the hope of recouping losses. The option chosen by
management will depend on the firm’s incentive structures as
well as regulatory and supervisory practices, and overall expec-
tations. If management’s performance is closely scrutinized and
paystructuresaretiedtoshort-termperformance,management
will likely choose to hide losses and pursue a higher risk/return
path. Strict capital requirements combined with lax oversight
makes this response even more probable, as management tries
to rebuild capital before the regulatory agencies discover the
losses and close the institution. The savings and thrift industry
reacted to insolvency in this way in the 1980s, and indeed, the
regulators in the Reagan administration encouraged them to do
just that (Black 2005).Public Policy Brief, No. 105 6
tained by lowering either credit or underwriting standards. If
incomegrowsat a 4percent pace,theability toservicedebt can-
not grow at orders of magnitude above that pace.Yet, high and
risingleveragemeansthatfinancialinstitutionsmustgrowfaster,
and that is partly the reason that a greater share of GDP and
profits was captured by the FIRE sector (Tymoigne 2009c).
But the situation is much worse than indicated by these
examples.In the early 1980s,then–Fed Chairman PaulVolcker’s
high interest rate policy killed the thrifts,and we transitioned to
a“market-based”financial system.To be sure,there already was
a long-term trend away from commercial banking and toward
nonbank financial institutions—what is now known as the
“shadowbankingsector.”Oneillustrationof thistransitionisthe
“originate to distribute” model, where institutions originate
loans that serve as collateral for securities sold in markets (Wray
2007, Minsky 2008). Jimmy Stewart’s thrift (as portrayed in the
1946 film It’s a Wonderful Life) was replaced by a high stakes
casino where everyone in the home finance food chain tacked
on fees for services: mortgage brokers, banks and thrifts that
originate loans,as well as property appraisers,accountants,title
insurers,ratingagencies,lawyers,mortgageandsecurityinsurers
(including credit default sellers),and security brokers and deal-
ers.Whateverwasleftof thehomeowner’sprincipalandinterest
payments was parceled out to various tranched securities held






lending is not a solution to excessive leverage and debt!
Inanyevent,thereisalwaysanincentivetoincreaseleverage
ratios and improve the return on equity.Assuming that the cap-
ital ratio is 5 percent and that banks can finance their earnings
position by issuing government-guaranteed liabilities, then $95
outof every$100gamblediseffectivelythegovernment’smoney
(in the form of insured deposits). In the worst case, the banks
will lose $5 of their own money,but if the gamble pays off,they
keepallof theprofits.Imaginewalkingintoacasinoandthegov-
ernment giving you $95 to gamble for every $5 you spend—and
you get to keep all of the winnings. What would you do? You
wouldplayforhighstakesof course!So,if subjectedonlytomar-





value of that“put”to the banks’owners. This is why guarantees
without close supervision are bound to create problems.
While the Basel agreements were supposed to increase cap-
ital requirements, the ratios were never high enough to make a
real difference, and the institutions were allowed to assess the
riskinessof their own assetsfor thepurposesof calculatingrisk-
adjusted capital ratios.If anything,Basel I and II contributed to
financialfragilityandthecollapseof theglobalfinancialsystem.
In lieu of closely regulated and supervised financial institutions,
effective capital requirements need to be very high—maybe 100
percent—to discourage excessively risky behavior, and risk
assessments must be performed at arm’s length by neutral par-
ties. We used to have a policy of “double indemnity,” whereby
owners were personally liable for twice the amount of a bank’s
losses.Thatprovision,plusprisontermsformanagersconvicted
of any unlawful activities, would perhaps provide the proper
constraints. Failing that, the only solution is to constrain bank
practices, such as the types of assets and liabilities that are
allowed on the banks’books.
Supervisors should always be wary of rapid growth, which
has proven to be a predictor of insolvency. Since there is always













Loans and Leases in Bank Credit


















Figure 1 BankCredit atAllU.S.Commercial Banks,
2000−09(inbillions of dollars)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
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Asimilartransformationoccurredthroughoutthefinancial
system,so leverage had to be very high (30,or even 300) to meet
return-on-equity goals. Since competition reduced returns,
leveraged money sought progressively riskier assets; hence, low
docs,nodocs,andNINJAloans.A2003fliersenttobrokersfrom
a mortgage company tells it all:“DidYou Know NovaStar Offers
to Completely Ignore Consumer Credit!” (Morgenson 2007b).
We now know the outcome,and it’s not pretty.
Leverage is a beautiful thing on the way up,and a disastrous
thingonthewaydown.Inourearlierexample,reducingleverage
from 20 to 12 would require the rival bank to unwind $16.7 bil-
lion in loans (40 percent of its balance sheet). In the crisis that
began in August 2007, most deleveraging took place off of the
banks’books,for two reasons.First,it is difficult to delever bank
deposits and loans because loans are idiosyncratic and therefore
hard to sell. Presumably, loans that appear on a bank’s books
today are there precisely because they are more difficult to secu-
ritize, and they cannot be recalled because debtors do not have
cashonhandforrepayment.Thus,positionscanonlybeunwound
slowly,as loans are repaid or as credit losses materialize.
Second, as highly leveraged institutions subject to some
oversight,bankscannotaffordtorecognizetheselossesortosell
their marketable assets into declining markets. As shown in
Figure 1, bank credit has not declined substantially since the
recession began in late 2007. Rather, it shows an upward trend,
as funding comes from the purchase of private securities rather
than loans, which are also trending upward despite the transi-
tion to a market-based system. However, the shadow banking
sector has greatly reduced its leverage by writing off bad debts
and recognizing losses. Of course, that is just the other side of
thecoininthelossof financialwealthglobally.Thus,muchof the
public scolding of banks for“not providing credit”is misplaced.






was only during the boom.When the bubble burst, these assets
becamehotpotatoesthatcouldbesoldonlyintodecliningmar-





























Figure 2 Change in theAssets of Asset-backed Securities Issuers,2002-09 (inbillionsof dollars)
MortgageAssets
Source: Federal Reserve (Series Z.1)
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lowing illustration of commercial real estate losses using com-
mercial mortgage-backed securities based on real-world values
beforeandafterthefinancialcrisis.Supposeanofficebuildingin
2006 is expected to generate $600,000 per year and markets are
capitalizing that income flow at a 6 percent rate. The building is
then estimated to be worth $10 million. Further assume that
lenderswillacceptaloan-to-value(LTV)ratioof 80percent,soa
purchasermustputup$2milliontoborrow$8million.Theterm
of the loan is five years, so the asset position will have to be refi-
nanced. After the crisis, the markets raise the capitalization rate
to 8 percent and lower the LTV ratio to 60 percent.Assuming the
rentalincomeisnotaffected,thebuildingisnowworthonly$7.5
million and the owner can borrow no more than $4.5 million in
order to refinance. Since the owner must pay off the original $8
million loan, he needs to come up with an additional $3.5 mil-
lion. If he cannot find the cash (or if he decides to sell the prop-
erty),thenthepriceof thebuildingfallstobetween$4.5million
(theborrowinglimit)and$7.5million(thevaluedeterminedby




because rental incomes will be depressed during a crisis, along
with expectations of further real estate price depreciation.
Thisexemplifiesthedownsideof amarket-basedsystemand
was one of the primary reasons for the intervention undertaken
by Washington, when the Fed and Treasury confronted the liq-
uiditycrisisbyextendingdepositinsurance;guaranteeing,lend-
ing against, and even buying commercial paper, asset-backed
commercialpaper,andmortgage-backedsecurities;openingthe
discount window to some shadow banks; and handing bank
charters to investment banks so that they would have access to
insured deposits. The government guarantee meant that there
would be no haircut,so it acted effectively as a circuit breaker to
stop the normal market process of deleveraging through asset
sales (i.e., by allowing the shadow banks to finance their asset
positions using depositors as creditors).
If the problem had been one of excessive leverage exclusive
tothefinancialsector,thecrisiscouldhavebeenresolvedbyget-
ting the financial institutions to accept one another’s liabilities
and refinance their positions in one another’s assets. But the
problem was one of excessive leverage throughout the global
economy,wheretherewastoomuchlendingagainstprospective
income flows and expected asset appreciation. Although the
“mark to market,” falling prices triggered more sales to avoid
greater losses, pushing prices even lower, in what Irving Fisher
and Minsky described as a “debt-deflation process”: the higher
the leverage ratio, the greater the impact when exiting a toxic
asset class.
The panic during this process was made much worse
because financial institutions typically financed their asset posi-
tions by issuing liabilities held by other financial institutions
(rather than to insured depositors). These institutions offered
collateral against the credit extended to them by others, while
creditors allowed a maximum leverage in collateralized borrow-
ing by demanding a“haircut.”As Tobias Adrian and Hyun Song
Shin (2009) explain,if the haircut is 2 percent,the borrower can
borrow $98 for each $100 of assets pledged as collateral. The
haircut must come out of equity (the borrower can finance only
$98of itsassetpositionbyissuingdebt,so$2mustbecoveredby
capital). That means a maximum leverage ratio of 50 when the
haircut is $2, of 25 when the haircut is $4, and so on. The hair-
cut varies by the riskiness of the asset and over time.
For instance, U.S. Treasuries had a haircut of a quarter of 1
percentbeforethecrisis(aborrowercouldobtainaloanequalto
99.75percentof thevalueof thesecuritiespledged).Thehaircut
increased to 2–4 percent for prime mortgage-backed securities
and to 18–25 percent for“mezzanine”level loans. If the average
haircut across a bank’s assets is 8 percent, then the maximum
leverage ratio is 12.5. By August 2008 (during the severe liquid-
ity crisis),the haircut was raised to 3 percent for U.S.Treasuries,
to 10–20 percent for prime mortgage-backed securities, and to
more than 35 percent for mezzanine loans. It rose to as high as
40 percent for high-yield (junk) bonds and 60 percent for asset-
backed securities. Since banks and shadow banks had leveraged
their safe assets during the boom, they were now stuffed with
assets exposed to large haircuts,making it expensive to raise the
credit to finance asset positions. Ultimately, they were forced to
selltheirpositions,whichdepressedassetpricesfurtherandrein-
forced their leverage problem (IMF 2008). When the entire
shadow banking sector tried to delever, institutions refused to
extend credit to one another except at huge haircuts, and they
tried to sell assets to other institutions that could not finance
positions in the assets they already held. Asset prices subse-
quently collapsed in a self-reinforcing spiral.
A similar process is under way in the commercial real estate
sector. One way to calculate the value of commercial real estate
is the income approach. Malay Bansal (2009) provides the fol-The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
market wants more deleveraging because of solvency risks
(ratherthanliquidityproblems),Washingtonwantstopreventit
inspiteof excessivedebtsandcollapsingincomes.Althoughsome
scavengers are buying toxic waste at deep discounts, debtors will
notbeabletoservicethedebts,andtherewillnotbeasustainable
recovery until these debts are reduced and incomes are growing.
The Debt Problem: Where Is the Problem and How
Big Is It?
As shown in Figure 3,the level of indebtedness of the U.S.econ-
omyisatanall-timehigh,andwellabovethedebt-to-GDPratio
on the eve of the Great Depression.In the early 1930s,the nomi-
nallevelof debtwasthreetimeshigherthanthevalueof nominal
GDP;in 2008,it was five times higher.
Even though politicians and commentators have been clam-
oringoverthestaggeringgovernmentdebtandsupposedlyunsus-
tainable fiscal deficits,it is the debt level of the private domestic
sectorthatshouldbeofgreatconcern.Theratioofprivatedomes-
tic debt relative to GDP in 2008 was 3.6, compared to 0.73 for
the government sector (0.53 for the federal government) and
0.58forgovernment-sponsoredenterprises.Whilethedebtprob-
lem is very serious, the concern about the federal deficit and its
effect on the public debt is misplaced. Not only is the govern-
ment debt low relative to the size of the economy, but as a mat-
ter of national accounting, deleveraging in the private sector
cannothappenwithoutanincreaseinthegovernmentdeficit.2In
addition,if the government deficit does not grow fast enough to
meet the saving needs of the private domestic sector, national
Sources: Carter et al. 2006; National Income and Product Accounts
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*Note: Prior to 1945, net public and net private debts are used (as defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census). From 1945 onward, Census data is replicated by using
data about total financial liabilities provided by the NIPA and Flow of Funds Accounts. Data for net public debt is approximated by taking total financial liabilities
foreachlevelof government,andbyremovinganymonetary,lifeinsurance,orpensionliabilities(thegovernmentsectorexcludesmonetaryauthorities).Privatedebt
iscomputedbystartingfrom“totalfinancetotalfinancialliabilities”and“domesticnonfinancialsectorstotalfinancialliabilities,”andbyremovingsomeitemsinorder
to get as close as possible to the definition used by the Census Bureau (which excludes monetary instruments and other liabilities of financial institutions). Flow of
Funds Table D.3,“Debt Outstanding by Sector,”is not used because it underestimates significantly the Census data about outstanding debt available until 1976. The
use of“total financial liabilities”(once adjusted for the elements that the Census Bureau removed) for each sector does a much better job of tracking Census data and
so allowed a comparison of pre-1945 data with data available from 1945.Public Policy Brief, No. 105 10
years, often trading up to a more expensive house; divorce rates
rose, increasing the burden of mortgage payments (possibly on
two houses); and second mortgages financed college education.
Nevertheless, home prices tended to rise fast enough to accom-
modate these additional burdens.
After the early 1970s, median real wages stagnated, unem-
ploymentratchetedupward,jobtenurebecamelesssecure,inter-
est rates were increasingly unstable and generally higher, and





ability to service debt out of income declined.
Thisresponsewasfrequentlyjustifiedbecauseof risingasset
values,especiallyhousing,aslenderswereblindedbythesurging
value of collateral rather than income.History shows that lend-
ing against expected rising asset values is almost always a recipe
for trouble—what Minsky called a Ponzi scheme.If asset values
stopclimbing,incomefalls,orfinancecostsrise,thedebtcannot
be serviced. Yet, there is a natural affinity for “market-based”
financetomovetowardasset-basedlendingmeasures.Anasset’s
value includes prospective income flows plus appreciation plus
(in the case of business assets) “goodwill.” The purchaser and
lender will build in a margin of safety that is largely a function
of asset price volatility.
The belief that we had entered the era of “the Great
Moderation”meantthatvolatilityhadfallen,somarginscouldbe
reduced.This is a common feature of speculative booms—mass
delusion that we have entered a new economy in which the only
direction is up (recall James Glassman and Kevin Hassett’s Dow
36,000 in the late 1990s, or Fisher’s statement on the eve of the
1929 stock market crash that stock prices “have reached a per-
manently high plateau”3). Further, appreciation and goodwill
grow faster than projected income in an asset price bubble, so a
larger portion of an asset’s valuation will depend on these
ephemeral sources. Finally, unlike current income that can be
documented,futureassetpricesdependonexpectationsthatare
subject to“whirlwinds”of optimism.
Here is the reason why the shift to markets and away from
banks matters.When a commercial bank makes a loan,the loan
officerwonders,“HowwillIgetrepaid?”Becausetheloanisilliq-
uidandwillbeheldtomaturity,theabilitytorepaymatters,since
it is prudent to rely on income flows rather than the possible
income will decline and a full-blown debt-deflation process will





GDP ratios for these subsectors were 1.0 and 1.3, respectively,
accountingfor64percentof thedebt-to-GDPratioof theprivate
sector. Nonfinancial corporate debt has grown at a more mod-
eratepace,butithasbeenaugmentedrecentlybyawaveof lever-
aged buyouts (IMF 2008).
To be sure, it is not easy to say how much debt is too much
(qualitymattersasmuch,if notmore,thanthequantityof debt).
Debt ratios have been rising since 1960, and the debt-to-GDP




rowers. The old postwar home-finance model was based on 30-
yearfixed-rate,self-amortizingloans.Interestrateswererelatively
low,householdsdidnothavemuchotherdebt,andincomeswere
doubling every generation. Locking in a 30-year fixed payment
meant that the debt service from growing income would fall by
half over the duration of the loan. Of course, it was more com-
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Figure 5 Household and FinancialSector DebtRelative to
Their Respective Income,1929−2008
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Carter et al. 2006; NIPA; Federal
Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts (from 1945)The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 11
seizure and forced sale of an asset in the distant future, under
unknown market conditions. When an investment bank makes
a loan,the loan officer wonders,“How will I sell this asset?”The
future matters only to the degree that it enters the asset’s value
today, since the asset will be sold immediately. Even the buyer
need not worry about the future: when confidence is high and
euphoria reigns, it is easy to sell an asset whose value is dispro-
portionately determined by expected appreciation (and good-
will). The sky’s the limit: it’s possible to justify any debt ratio
because it will fall automatically as the asset appreciates.
As late as spring 2007, Fed economists were presenting
papers (e.g., at the Levy Institute’s annual Minsky conference)
that denied real estate was overvalued or that there was a credit
bubblebecauserealestatevalueswouldcontinuetoriseandval-
idate the debt (the vast majority of economists were in a similar
stateof denial).AsformerFedChairmanAlanGreenspanration-
alized during the dot-com boom, how can one argue with the
wisdomof tensof millionsof marketplayers?4JohnK.Galbraith
(1997) nicely captures the circularity of such group-think:“It is
difficult not to marvel at the imagination which was implicit in
this gargantuan insanity. If there must be madness something
may be said for having it on a heroic scale.”
Indeed,this was a fundamental reason for the separation of
commercial and investment banking in the aftermath of the
1930s collapse. Under the new rules, commercial banks would
make and hold loans, issuing insured deposits to finance posi-
tions. As loans would be held to maturity, there was no need to
mark to (fleeting) market values. During a bubble, banks were
unable to count asset price appreciation as a source of profits
andequity;norwasitnecessarytorecognizelossesif assetprices
fell.Since the value of most of their liabilities (deposits) did not
fluctuate,thepracticeof ignoringassetpricechangeswouldkeep
balance sheets stable. By contrast, investment banks and other
financial institutions were subject to market fluctuations—rec-
ognizing capital gains and rewarding traders with bonuses in
good times, and taking losses and downsizing portfolios in a
bust. The market-based institutions were highly procyclical,
while commercial banks could be much less so.5
Unfortunately, as we freed commercial banks to become
brokersanddealersinmarketedassets,wemovedstronglyinthe
oppositedirection,allowingthemtoleveragegovernmentmoney
(insured deposits) with little supervision.We also allowed them
tousetheirowncomplexandproprietarymodelstovalueassets
andassessrisk.Whenthefinancialcrisisarrived,wehandedbank
charters to the remaining investment banks so that they could
also use government money to speculate in asset markets. This
response represents an ironic completion of the circle,since the
main justification for deregulating commercial banks was to
allow them to compete with the (much more efficient) shadow
bankingsector.Butwhentheseshadowbankscollapsed,wegave
them access to insured deposits so that they could compete with
the banks. We also promoted the consolidation of institutions
that were “too big to fail” (or rather,“too big to supervise”), so
that management and owners had nothing to fear: only govern-
ment money was at risk, and government had neither the will
northecompetencytooverseethegamblingundertakenbythese
institutions.
Such government policies have failed to “jump-start” Wall
Street,letalonetheeconomy.Debtloadsremainexcessive,while
incomeandemploymentcontinuetofall,anddelinquenciesand
foreclosures continue to rise. Even at current, depressed prices,
assets are overvalued and many financial institutions are insol-
vent, holding mountains of toxic waste that will never be worth
anything.
The Response of the Obama Administration
TheObamaadministrationhasimplementedseveralpolicieswith
twopremisesattheircore.First,theadministrationhasstatedthat
the crisis is simply monetary and thus requires monetary meas-
ures to strengthen the financial system before the rest of the
economy can recover (echoingargumentsmadeby Fisher in the
early 1930s). As observed by James K. Galbraith (2009a, 2009b),
theproblemisdeemedto be no more serious than some clogged




anisms will restore the true, higher value of “legacy”assets over
time,and the economy will recover when the banks are healthy.
These two premises have been used to focus most of the
administration’s efforts on preserving the financial interests of
majorbanks.Thegovernmenthascommittedatleast$23.7trillion
dollars to support the economy—through the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP), Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and U.S. Treasury—and $2.3
trillionhasbeenspentthroughJune30,2009(SIGTARP2009a).
Mostof thismoneyhasbeenallocatedtothefinancialsector,andPublic Policy Brief, No. 105 12
onlyminimalefforthasbeenmadetosolvethedebtproblemsof
households and nonfinancial businesses.
At the outset, and under a cloud of secrecy, the Obama
administration allowed Bush-Paulson’s TARP to continue help-
ingthefinancialsector,andtheTreasurytocontinuepickingthe
winners for government funding (Morgenson and Van Natta
2009). Following an outcry about the slow progress in improv-
ing oversight, the TARP Special Inspector General (SIGTARP)
and the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) were installed in
December 2008. These bodies have been very worried about
fraud,particularlywiththeextensionof TARPprogramstoward




Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) borrowers (SIG-
TARP 2009a, 7). SIGTARP has already announced two investi-
gations and is in the process of improving TARP transparency
on its own,without the support of the Treasury.6
TheCapitalPurchaseProgram(CPP)of TARPwasfollowed
by 11 subprograms, of which seven have been directed toward
restoring the profitability and solvency of financial institutions,
and which, along with CPP, account for 77 percent of the $441
billionalreadyusedasseedmoney(SIGTARP2009a,37ff.).This
came on top of massive efforts by the Fed,the FDIC,and others
to stabilize financial institutions.Three core plans within TARP
are the Capital Assistance Program (CAP), the Public-Private
InvestmentProgram(PPIP),andTALF.Theseplansaimtoshow
thepublicthatbanksaresolventandneedonlytemporaryassis-
tance because of (temporarily) malfunctioning financial mar-
kets. For example, PPIP was promoted to create a market for
“legacy”assets.Forpotentialbuyers,theprogramwashighlygen-
erous,sincetheTreasuryandFDICtookmostof theriskandlit-
tle of the gains (so much for a market approach). Nevertheless,
theprogramhasfailed,largelybecauseof banks’unwillingnessto
sell at huge discounts (sometimes as low as 10 cents on the dol-
lar) and thus reveal their deep insolvency. Above all, banks do
not want legacy assets to be valued properly.
PIMCO flirted with the idea of creating a fund that would
allow investors to take positions in toxic waste, before realizing
that this approach could create a public relations nightmare if
the company was seen to be making a profit at taxpayers’
expense. Furthermore, if the public bought into the fund and it
thencollapsed(becausethetroubledassetsneverrecovered),the
company would be blamed for bilking investors. More recently,
however, BlackRock, one of the world’s largest publicly traded
investment management firms, rushed into the void by





and Uncle Sam would assume the losses.
Previously, BlackRock proposed to do essentially the same
thing under the Master-Liquidity Enhancement Conduit (M-
LEC) “superfund” scheme. The main difference was that banks
weresupposedtoassumemostof therisk.Thissuperfundnever
took off because there were not enough banks willing to back it.
FinancialinsidersknewthattheM-LECwastoosmall(only$75
billion,when trillions were needed),and no more than a means
of temporarily parking trash in order to avoid massive unload-
ing of toxic assets by the special-purpose vehicles.The continu-
ing failure to find other financial professionals willing to hold
these toxic assets has meant that financial institutions are turn-
ing to Uncle Sam for more cash to burn.
None of these programs has dealt with the core issues at
stake: many financial institutions are probably insolvent and
need to be closed;assets must be analyzed carefully to figure out
potential profits and the true state of financial institutions; and
aninvestigationmustdeterminetheresponsibilitiesof topman-
agers. Although financial markets have stabilized, they remain
heavilysupportedbythegovernment,andwehavenotdealtwith









The recently announced Public-Private Investment Fund
focuses directly on the problem of impaired assets;that ini-
tiativereflectstheworkingpremisethatitispossiblethrough
government-subsidized,highlyleveragedassetpurchasevehi-
cles to obtain valuations for non-performing or otherwise
troubled assets, sell those assets at those values to willingThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 13
buyers,andperhapsavoidtheneedforthereorganization or
eventhebreak-upof systemicallysignificantfinancialinsti-
tutions. Treasury has not explained its assumption that the
proper values for these assets are their book values—in the
case, for example, of land or whole mortgages—and more
than their “mark-to-market” value in the case of ABSs,
CDOs, and like securities; if values fall below those floors,
the banks involved may be insolvent in any event. Treasury
hasalsofailedtoexplainitsassumptionsabouttheeconomic
events that would cause investors to default or how long it
believes assets will have to be held to produce a reasonable
return for private investors.(USCOP 2009a,75)
TALF cannot address the creditworthiness issue.It can pro-
videmorefundstothelendersforlending,butasset-backed
securities have never been the source of significant funding
for small businesses. This report raises the question of
whetherTALFwillhaveameaningfulimpactonsmallbusi-
ness credit.(USCOP 2009b,4)
In short, the entire array of programs will work only if the
problem is one of temporary illiquidity, not one of excessive
leverage and debt or a legacy of vastly overvalued assets based
on economic scenarios that will never be realized. Given this
inappropriatepremiseindealingwithfinancialinstitutionlever-




In addition to eight TARP programs and other policies ori-
ented toward bolstering the financial system, several programs
haveaddresseddebtinthenonfinancialsector.However,thetotal
committed support for the sector is only $887.4 billion, includ-
ing$700billioninpotentialguaranteesbytheFDICand$75bil-
lionand$8.4billion,respectively,allocatedtoservicersandcredit
unions for mortgage modification. Of the amount committed,
only $130.4 billion has been spent, through a TARP fund made
available to car producers that includes a $19 billion tax credit
provided by the Housing and Economy Recovery Act of 2008,
and other means (SIGTARP 2009a, 137). Total committed sup-
portforthenonfinancialsectorrepresentsjust3.7percentof the
$23.7 trillion pledged to support the overall economy, and only
5.7percentof the$2.3trillionalreadyspent.Therestisallocated
to financial institutions.
The Making Home Affordable (MHA) program, which
expandedtheHOPEforHomeownersprogramputinplacedur-
ing the George W. Bush administration, was allocated $50 bil-
lion through TARP, for a total funding allocation of $75 billion.
MHA aims to provide financial assistance to servicers to modify
private-labelmortgagesandrefinanceconformingmortgages.In
May 2009, this program was expanded upon by the Helping
Families Save Their Homes Act.
There is a great need for these initiatives.Delinquency rates
are climbing sharply, the result of rising unemployment and,
more significantly, poor underwriting procedures that include
loans to prime borrowers. Figure 6 clearly illustrates that prime
borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) have serious
delinquency rates equivalent to those of subprime borrowers.
Preliminary results for government programs show that
they do not go far enough in dealing with the household debt
problem, with only 235,247 mortgages modified as of July
(USDT2009).HOPENOW,aprivateinitiativesupportedbythe
Treasury,the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
andFreddieMac,wasmoresuccessfulin2008,whenithelped2.3
million homeowners avoid foreclosure. None of these programs,
however, has been able to keep pace with the rapidly growing
number of foreclosures (Figure 7). There is also mounting frus-
tration among households, who are frequently unable to contact
their servicers. Moreover, interest-rate resets are expected to rise
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Figure 6 Serious DelinquencyamongMortgagors,
1998−2009(inpercent)
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substantive is done (IMF 2007,8).A Deutsche Bank report pre-
dictsthatthenumberof mortgagorswhowillbeunderwaterwill
rise from 27 to 48 percent by 2011, representing approximately
25 million U.S. households that have predominantly
conforming mortgages (most exotic mortgages are already
underwater) (Weaver and Shen 2009).
There are additional concerns about how households are
beinghelped,sincecurrent approachesdiscourageservicersand
holders of structured securities from renegotiating loans. First,
the rate for redefaults within six months of a loan modification
is expected to reach 30 to 45 percent (Adelino, Gerardi, and
Willen 2009).A 2009 report by the Office of the Comptroller of
theCurrency(OCC)andtheOfficeof ThriftSupervision(OTS)
shows that, among two thirds of first-lien mortgages, serious
delinquency (90 days or more past due) reached 36.1 percent
after nine months for loans modified during the first quarter of
2008, and 41.8 percent for loans modified during the second
quarter (OCC and OTS 2009, 29). Loans modified during the
third and fourth quarters were on track to show even worse
delinquency rates. Thus, marginal and temporary loan modifi-
cations will not suffice. We need a significant and permanent
reductionof debtpayments,particularlyinlightof theredefault
rates of second-lien mortgages.
Second,loan modifications may entail large fees and penal-
ties that households cannot afford, and, depending on circum-
stances and state laws, modifying a mortgage might lead to a
changefromanonrecoursetoarecourseloan—withevengraver
consequences in the case of redefault. Third, these loan modifi-
cationsusuallyoccuraftertheborrowerhasbeendelinquentfor
a long time. Past policy initiatives such as Project Lifeline pro-
vided a strong incentive to remain delinquent for 90 days by not
considering a loan modification before that time.This response
contributedtohigherredefaultrates,since“themoreseriousthe
delinquency,thelesslikelytheborrowerwillremaincurrentafter
modification”(OCC and OTS 2009,31).
Fourth, financial scams are on the rise. Subprime lenders
are becoming loan modifiers and luring households to pay large







lien of $840,000 on a house worth $470,000, starting with a 3
percent interest rate (for five years) that would rise gradually to
6.25 percent by year nine.The balloon payment would be about
$250,000 at the end of year 30,thereby crushing a debtor with a
heavy financial burden.There is a high probability that the bor-
rower would have to sell the house at the end of the mortgage.
Fifth, securitization prevents loan modifications because
the financial interest in outstanding mortgages is spread among
manydifferentparties.Thisisespeciallytruefornonconforming
mortgages packaged into private-label MBSs. These limits to
efficient modification are compounded by servicers who have
a fiduciary duty toward the holders of structured securities:
“Changing the terms of the mortgages, they contend, can hurt
investors by reducing interest payments. Lawsuits could follow”
(Morgenson 2009).As a consequence,the redefault rate is much
higher on securitized mortgages:
Loans held on the books of servicing banks and thrifts had
the lowest re-default rates at 35.06 percent after three
months,and 50.86 percent after six months,compared with
loansservicedonbehalf of thirdparties.Thelowerre-default
rateforloansheldbyservicersmaysuggestthatthereisgreater
flexibility to modify loans in more sustainable ways when
loansareheldonaservicer’sownbooksthanwhenloanshave
been sold to third parties (OCC and OTS 2008,21).
Nobody seems to know the location of the mortgage deed or
even who holds the deed, often leaving judges with little means
to bring financial troubles to a close (Morgenson 2007a). The
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practice of foreclosing without the deed became common dur-
ing the boom,even though it is illegal (Porter 2007).
Sixth, as noted above, servicers have contributed to this
problem by providing marginal modifications, charging dubi-
ousfees,prematurelyforeclosingonproperties,andengagingin
illegal actions, such as destroying mortgage checks, that have
gone unpunished (Porter 2007, Morgenson 2007c). Katherine
Porter found unsubstantiated fees and missing documentation
for half of the loans she examined, and an Associated Press
(2009) report shows that these problems are extensive among
servicershelpedbyMHA.Servicershaveanincentivetoholdout
for a foreclosure rather than renegotiate. Perhaps the real prob-
lemisthatthefinancialinstitutionsthatcreatedthemessarepre-
venting resolution because it is more profitable, based on the
money to be made by squeezing debtors with fees and penalties,
to ride out the collapse (Goodman 2009b,UBS 2007).
Mortgage servicers earn revenue in three major ways. First,
theyreceiveafixedfeeforeachloan.Typicalarrangementspay
servicers between .25% and 1.375% of the note principal for
eachloan.Second,servicersearn“float”incomefromaccrued
interest between when consumers pay and when those funds




enue comes from retained fee income. Because of this struc-
ture, servicers’ incentives upon default may not align with
investors’incentives.Servicers have incentives to make it dif-
ficultforconsumerstocuredefaults.…Mortgageservicerscan
exploit consumers’ difficulty in recognizing errors or over-
charges by failing to provide comprehensible or complete
information. In fact, poor service to consumers can actually
maximize servicers’profits.(Porter 2007,5–6)
As discussed above, when the thrifts were destroyed in the
1980s, we transitioned to a new “market-based” home finance
modelinvolvingindependentmortgagebrokers,propertyapprais-
ers,riskraters,titlecompanies,mortgageinsurers,creditdefault
swap sellers, mortgage servicers, securitizers, accounting firms,
commercial banks, investment banks, and pension funds and
othermanagedmoneythatultimatelyheldthesecurities.Inthis
originate-to-distributemodel,almosteveryonewhoservicesthe
securities lives on fee income rather than on the interest and
principal payments related to mortgages. Of course, this is part
of thereasonwhynoonebotheredtocheckwhetherhomeown-
ers could afford to make their mortgage payments.
It is also the reason that almost no one in the home finance
food chain cares about resolving the mortgage crisis—it is far
more profitable if the homeowner cannot or does not make any
payment. When payments cease, the mortgage company that
services the loan makes the payments, which are then distrib-
uted among holders of the securities. In return, the mortgage
company collects its normal servicing fee plus late fees amount-
ing to 6 percent of the monthly payment. Late fees alone can
amount to 12 percent of the total revenue received by loan ser-
vicers. Thus,it is in the interest of mortgage companies to max-
imizethenumberof delinquencies,aswellastheamountof time
that households are delinquent.
When a mortgage is foreclosed, the mortgage servicer has
first claim to the revenue from the sale of the house. According




values fall by “only” 30 percent. Thus, mortgage companies
actively interfere to ensure that homeowners are unable to rene-
gotiate the terms of their mortgages. According to Peter
Goodman(2009b),theyprefer“purgatory—neithertakingcon-
trol of houses and selling them, nor modifying loans to give
homeowners a break.” They and their subsidiaries accumulate
late fees and are paid for services such as title searches,insurance
policies,appraisals,andlegalfindingsthatarerecoupeduponsale
oftheproperty.Thisexplainswhycurrentgovernmentpoliciesare
unable to keep people in their homes. In spite of government
offerstopaymortgagecompaniesupto$4,000tomodifyaloan,
the companies make more money by driving owners out.
Asimilarstoryappliestoothersectorsintheeconomy,where
financial market participants who helped to create the crisis are
subsequently hired as contractors to deal with the fallout. Thus,
there is more money to be made from a long and deep crisis.
Hence,mostoftheefforttowardsolvinghouseholddebtproblems
has focused on refinancing and loan modifications rather than
on sustaining or improving income and creditworthiness—and
the effort has failed miserably.
In addition to its major role in helping the financial sector
and its minor role in helping homeowners, the Obama admin-
istration and Congress have provided a $787 billion stimulusPublic Policy Brief, No. 105 16
package under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA). Approximately $150 billion is allocated to state and
localgovernments(andunemploymentbenefits),while$250bil-
lion is earmarked for households (tax cuts and some social
spending) and $200 billion is to be used for infrastructure.As of
May 2009, only 6 percent ($50 billion) of the stimulus package
had been implemented, and almost half of this amount went
toward Medicaid costs for state and local governments. The
remainder was paid out in Social Security benefits and unem-
ployment compensation for households.
A total of $80 billion per quarter is to be spent through the
end of 2010,an amount that represents approximately 2.25 per-
centof GDP.However,first-quarterpersonalincomein2009fell
at an 8 percent pace,while the number of hours worked fell by 7
percent in the second quarter. This indicates that the prelimi-
nary GDP numbers (falling at “only” a 1 percent pace) will be
reviseddownward.Bytheendof summer2009,theUnitedStates
had lost about 7 million jobs, versus a gain of 2.5 million new
jobsduringanormalexpansionof thelaborforce—atotalof 9.5
million fewer jobs than at the start of the downturn. President
Obama’spromisetocreatethreemillionnewjobs(andestimates
that the stimulus package will save between 2.5 and 3.5 million
jobs) indicates that current efforts are grossly insufficient.
Muchof thetalkinWashingtonisaboutthe“unsustainable”
budget deficits, so it is unlikely that another stimulus package
willbeforthcoming.Webelievethatthisresponseisdueinlarge
part to the public’s fury toward the government’s rescue of Wall
Street. In this sense, the financial bailout has crowded out more
sensible spending policies.
Alternative Policy
Using arguments very similar to those made by John Maynard
Keynes in the 1930s, the approach taken by the administration
has been critiqued very thoroughly by many economists who
deny that our problems can be solved by rescuing Wall Street
(e.g., James K. Galbraith and William Kurt Black). In addition,
Wray 2009 provides a detailed set of policies both for the short
run (to deal with the crisis) and for the long run (to build a sus-
tainableeconomicandfinancialsystem).Wewillnotrepeatthose
arguments here. Rather, we will focus in the broadest terms on
two issues: how can we stimulate recovery, and how can we put
finance into its proper role?
In our view,most administration proposals are fundamen-
tally misguided, since they are based on the twin presumptions
that Big Banks face only a liquidity problem and that, if this
problem is resolved, the economy will recover.We believe these
presumptions are entirely mistaken. The Big Bank problem is
insolvency, and these banks should not be saved because they
formabarriertoasustainablerecovery.Givenachance,theywill
resurrect the bubble conditions that led to the current crisis.
Thebestapproachresemblesabanking“holiday,”wherethe
largest (19)bankingandshadowbankinginstitutionsareclosed
for a brief period so that supervisors can assess the problems—
including uncovering the claims that the Big Banks have against
oneanother.Itishighlylikelythatsuchclaimsrepresenttrillions
of dollars of bad assets (e.g., an examination of AIG uncovered
such linkages when the government bailout of the company
resulted in side payments to the Big Banks and shadow banks).
By consolidating the balance sheets of these types of banking
institutionsandnettingoutsuchclaimsagainstoneanotherprior
toshuttingthemdown,thecollateraldamagefortheotherbanks
and shadow banks,as well as the level of government assistance,
will be relatively small. This approach will help to downsize the
financial sector and reduce monopoly power. Moving forward,
policyshouldfavorsmallandindependentfinancialinstitutions.
Greater supervision and regulation of the financial sector is
particularlyimportantif we’retostopthepracticesthatbrought
on the crisis. Based on the absence of regulations in the early
1930s and again in the 1980s, market mechanisms will push
management and owners of insolvent institutions to ramp up
losses, resulting in massive deflation, bankruptcies, and the
destruction of physical assets, in combination with enormously




rowers cannot service their debts. This situation implies sus-
taining incomes and employment, and, if necessary, drastically
modifyingthedebt-serviceburden.Theboomof theearly2000s
(and, more broadly, the growth process since the early 1980s)
was based on household borrowing and deficit spending.
There are two key ways to alter this approach to economic
growth and stimulate recovery.First,a household’s main source
of income is employment, which is linked to the state of the
economy. Policy can“decouple” this link through countercycli-
cal government employment programs such as those created inThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 17
the 1930s under the New Deal. In one case, the Works Progress
Administration (WPA) spent $11 billion in its first six years on
constructionandconservationprojects,andoncommunityserv-
ice programs, employing eight million workers. Meanwhile, the
Civilian Conservation Corps employed 2.75 million workers at
a dollar a day to reclaim government land and forests through
irrigation, soil enrichment, pest control, tree planting, fire pre-
vention,andotherconservationprojects;andtheNationalYouth
Administration enabled 1.5 million high school students and
600,000 college students to continue their education by providing
part-timejobs.Bytheendof1934,morethan20millionAmericans
(oneoutofsix!)werereceivingassistancefromthe“WelfareState.”8
About 26 million people currently lack a steady full-time
job,and this number is climbing rapidly (Figure 8).Meanwhile,
thedesperatelyunemployedareswayedbyemploymentscamsthat
promisehelpforalargeupfrontfee(Richmond2009).Government
employment programs would automatically resolve this kind of
unemploymentintheabsenceof privatesectorhiring.And,inan
economic upswing, the private sector would subsequently hire
workersoutof thegovernmentprograms.Thiswouldstrengthen
theautomatic stabilizer effect of theseprograms,sincespending
would be countercyclical.
These federal jobs programs should be permanent,since 10
to 15 million people are unemployed or underemployed during
the best of times. In addition, these programs could be struc-
turedtopayalivingwagetiedtoproductivitygains,whichwould
helptorestorethepurchasingpowerof householdsafter35years
of stagnant real wages. The growth process would be sound
financially, as consumption would grow in tandem with real
wages (and with productivity to avoid inflation).
Employment guarantees, however, are not enough to deal
with the current crisis,since households have accumulated debt
wellbeyondtheirmeansandgovernmentemploymentprograms
would pay, on average, lower wages than many households pre-
viously earned.As a result, the jobs programs provide only par-
tialrelief of thedebtproblem,andaneedforloanmodifications
combined with simpler and less costly bankruptcy proceedings.
Basedonpastsolutions,someeconomistshavesuggesteda“debt
jubilee”—thecancellationof householdsectordebt—andcredit
card companies have begun to use this approach (Streitfeld
2009).Webelievethatthegovernmentshouldprovideincentives
to encourage more financial companies to follow suit.
If borrowers meet their payments, lenders will return to
profitability and some of the securitization processes will be
revived.It may be time to reform the financial system by reduc-
ing the trade-and-fee-driven financial sector, but such a reform
was not suggested by the 2009 Department of Treasury Report,
which is mostly a copy of the 2008 Paulson Report. What is
needed is a return toward term lending by regulated financial
institutions that hold loans and a restoration of incentives to
engage in proper underwriting.9 (Tymoigne 2009b provides a
detailed critique of recent proposals for financial reform.)
Onespecificproblemwiththecurrentcrisisisthatitinvolves
highly desirable long-term physical assets: homes.Traditionally,
debt problems are dealt with by the liquidation or destruction
of borrower assets. Given the high desirability of homes, how-
ever,thereshouldbeanalternativemethodof dealingwithexcess
supply. Several economists, such as Warren Mosler (2009) and
DeanBaker(2009),havealreadyprovidedasolutiontothisprob-
lem. The government would simplify the foreclosure process and
standreadytobuythehomesof distressedmortgagorsatcurrent
marketvalueorthevalueof themortgage,whicheverisless.This
wouldallowthehomeowner toleasetheproperty at a fair rental
price, with an option to buy it back after two years at the pre-
vailingmarketprice.Thisapproachwouldnotonlydealwiththe
excess supply of homes (and put a floor under home prices) but
also help households to restructure their finances while remain-
ing in their homes (a small step in this direction was made
recently; see Merle 2009).
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We need to modify significantly the principal and interest
owed, so that debt servicing becomes possible through the nor-
mal funding of homeowners (i.e., income) for the length of the
loan(meaning,forexample,noballoonorteaserpayments).The
amount owed should also be modified to account for large neg-
ative equities held by some homeowners.In addition,modifica-
tions should not assume that home sales would be the normal
means of servicing mortgages in the future.
Datashowthattheredefaultrateisconsiderablylowerwhen
modificationinvolvesloweringmonthlypaymentsby20percent
or more (e.g., an over-60-days delinquency rate of 37.6 percent
after 12 months, compared to 58.8 percent without any change




be modified,even if borrowers are not currently delinquent.
Amajorincreaseingovernmentspendingistheonlywayto
smooththedeleveragingprocess.Asopposedtonewmoney,part
of the $20-plus trillion committed to help the financial sector
could be reallocated to finance the programs outlined above. In
anycase,thesizeof thebudgetdeficitisreallyaredherring,since
a sovereign government can always afford to buy what is for
sale—whether unemployed labor, real estate, or toxic financial
assets. And it is not clear that the spending proposed here will
increase the budget deficit, which already exceeds $1 trillion
per year before the stimulus package has fully kicked in. (This is
because the budget deficit is determined endogenously for the
most part.)
There are two ways to obtain large budget deficits: the“ugly”
way and the“virtuous”way.We have used the first,destroying tax
revenue caused by a collapsing private sector (much as Japan did
duringitslostdecade).Thevirtuouspathisthroughtheapplication
of more aggressive fiscal stimulus that turns the private sector
around and begins to produce more tax revenue, so that large
deficits are short-lived. If we continue down the ugly path and
robust recovery does not begin for many years, there will also be
large budget deficits for many years.While that outcome does not
worry us (in the sense that it cannot make our sovereign govern-
ment insolvent), the outcome in terms of job losses and real suf-
feringofthepopulationdoes.Thus,itisbettertospendonamuch
biggerscalenowinordertocreatejobsandrekindleprivatesector
growth.If we do that,the budget deficit will shrink and GDP will
grow,whilegovernmentdebt-anddeficit-to-GDPrateswillfall.
Notes
1. Of course, one may argue that these assets always were
hot potatoes. Loans are illiquid even with securitization.
Asset-backedsecurities(whicharesecuritiesissuedbyspecial-
purpose entities that are backed by illiquid claims) have
been somewhat more liquid, but many of these still entail
a buy-and-hold strategy because of very thin markets
(Tymoigne 2009c).
2. By identity, the government deficit equals the nongovern-
ment surplus. If the U.S. private sector rebuilds its balance
sheet by spending less than its income,the government has
to spend more than its tax revenue. The only other possi-
bility is that the rest of the world spends massively—letting
the United States run a current account surplus—but that
situation is highly implausible.
3. See Galbraith (1997, 70). Bernard Baruch presaged
Greenspan’scheerleadingforthe1990sNewEconomyboom
when he said in June 1929,“The economic condition of the
world seems on the verge of a great forward movement.”
4. Greenspan might have been channeling the ghost of
Princeton professor Joseph Stagg Lawrence, who remarked
in the summer of 1929:“The consensus of judgment of the
millionswhosevaluationsfunctiononthatadmirablemar-
ket, the Stock Exchange, is that stocks are not at present
over-valued.… Where is that group of men with the all-
embracingwisdomwhichwillentitlethemtovetothejudg-
ment of this intelligent multitude?” (Galbraith 1997, 70).
The inability of economists to foresee crisis is well known,
but what is less recognized is their inability to face up to
crises even when they are under way.As Galbraith notes,in
November 1929, the Harvard Economic Society (compris-
ing the university’s more conservative economics faculty)
announced,“Aseveredepressionlikethatof1920–21isoutside
the range of possibility.We are not facing protracted liqui-
dation” (Galbraith 1997, 71). He goes on to note that the
Society reiterated this view over the course of the Great
Depression,until it was itself liquidated.
5. They would of course still be somewhat procyclical,since the
demand for loans as well as creditworthiness moves with the
cycle.Buttheywouldnotbeforcedtoselloff theirloanssim-
ply because asset prices were falling; so long as firms and
households would eventually recover sufficiently to service
debt,theloanscouldberetainedandmarkedtooriginalvalue.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 19
6. SIGTARP recently released a report on the use of funds by
financial institutions that used TARP funds; see SIGTARP
2009b.
7. From 1929 to 1931,those deflationary market mechanisms
were reinforced by recessive fiscal and monetary policies
based on the principle that government should get out of
the way.In addition,fiscal and monetary policies were con-
strained by the need to maintain the exchange rate between
the dollar and gold.
8. During the Great Depression,“the government hired about
60 per cent of the unemployed in public works and conser-
vationprojectsthatplantedabilliontrees,savedthewhoop-
ingcrane,modernizedruralAmerica,andbuiltsuchdiverse
projects as the Cathedral of Learning in Pittsburgh, the
Montana state capitol,much of the Chicago lakefront,New
York’s Lincoln Tunnel and Triborough Bridge complex,the
TennesseeValleyAuthority,andtheaircraftcarriersEnterprise
andYorktown”(Auerback2009,4).Italsobuiltorrenovated
2,500 hospitals, 45,000 schools, 13,000 parks and play-
grounds, 7,800 bridges,700,000 miles of roads,and a thou-
sand airfields.And it employed 50,000 teachers, rebuilt the
country’sentireruralschoolsystem,andhired3,000writers,
musicians, sculptors, and painters, including Willem de
Kooning and Jackson Pollock. The late Hyman P. Minsky
workedintheWPAasayoungeconomist,estimatingCobb-
Douglas production functions for the future Senator Paul
Douglas(Auerback2009;NRPB1942,342–43,notes4,5,8).
9. Recent proposals to make the Federal Reserve the primary
regulator of financial stability are misplaced, since the task
would be given mainly to economists (most of whom
believe in the neutrality of money and have a weak under-
standing of finance and accounting issues), and since the
Fed has a poor track record in terms of handling financial
stability issues. Substantial modifications to the Fed struc-
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